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Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that, in the drive to subvert the gender status quo and bring about 
gender justice, women’s personal development education should not be abandoned. It should, 
however, be reconstituted and radically politicised, by taking on board feminist 
poststructuralist insights about the human subject and the social world. Such insights 
challenge the liberal humanist models of the person which dominate most approaches to adult 
education, including women’s personal development education  In turn, these models have 
much in common with mainstream psychology. In attending to the personal, we need to 
recognise the restrictive nature of the dominant frameworks which shape our thinking about 
the personal and the emotional.  
The chapter argues that it is essential that we attend to the personal in the search for change, 
because a focus on structural change alone will not suffice: the intrapersonal emotional 
responses and changed interpersonal relations which accompany sructural change must also 
be given attention. This is not to say that structural and material concerns should be 
abandoned, but that, attended to in isolation, they are inadequate for lasting social change, 
just as, personal change alone is also inadequate.  
Underlying the argument is a critique of liberal humanist views of power, which see it solely 
as juridical in nature. I assert the value of theories of power which recognise its discursive 
and dispersed nature, as well as its juridical aspects. A further underpinning argument is the 
critique of essentialist models of women and of femininity / masculinity. These models are 
shown to dominate considerations of the personal in women’s education.  
The chapter concentrates on the theoretical assumptions about the person and about power 
which are implicit or explicit in dominant feminist approaches to women’s education, as well 
as in the criticisms of personal development education. It does not seek to put forward a 
blueprint for personal development courses, although I have already outlined a model which 
shapes my own practice (Ryan, 1997a: Ch 9). Rather, the chapter aims to give practitioners 
some theoretical tools to examine the assumptions underpinning their own practices. It 
further encourages theorists and practitioners to question the explanatory power of liberal 
humanist assumptions aabout the person, and to develop theories adequate for explaining the 
complexity of subjectivity  and gender identity in late modern Irish society.  
 
Context for the development of women’s personal development education in Ireland 
During the late 1980s and 1990s the women’s movement in Ireland has been most evident in 
the rapid growth of community based women’s groups, the consolidation of Women’s 
Studies in Irish universities and growth in women’s publishing (Connolly, 1996: 68). In the 
community women’s groups, new forms of structure and organisation have emerged, 
emphasising non-hierarchical relations, participation and autonomy (see, for example, 
Costello, this volume). Collins (1992) considers that these groups resemble the small-group, 
consciousness raising radical women’s sector of the 1970s, although this view is disputed by 
O’Donovan and Ward (1996). Some of these groups are autonomous, some are highly 
interconnected and networked with the generic community groups movement and others are 
connected to the state through its various funding programmes (Connolly, 1996: 68) and 
through the Home- School- Community Links Scheme. This growth co-exists with the 
growth in the last decade of interest in personal power, spirituality, counselling, 
psychotherapy and the life of the emotions, which form part of what Giddens (1991) 
describes as projects of personal reflexivity.  
A strong anti-feminist climate also exists. Inglis (1994) highlights the role of the Roman 
Catholic church in the backlash, as does Byrne (1995: 13). Wilcox (1991, cited in 
O’Donovan and Ward, 1996: 16) concludes that Catholicism is a determining factor in 
people’s attitudes to greater gender equality in family roles. O’Dovonan and Ward (ibid) 
point out that Galligan (1993) has developed this by arguing that while there is a great 
demand for equality in all aspects of what she terms public life in Ireland, social attitudes and 
values indicate that there is considerable public pressure on women to achieve equality, while 
retaining their traditional family roles. O’Donovan and Ward (1996: 17) conclude that ‘to 
argue that women’s groups per se are inherently part of the feminist movement is akin to 
arguing that woman, by definition, is feminist’. The writings of some male journalists (for 
example, Myers, 1997; Waters, 1997; see also Spray, 1997) are evidence that an anti-feminist 
men’s movement has also has begun to manifest itself recently in Ireland.  
For the most part the women’s groups have concentrated their activities on personal 
development courses (Daly, 1989a). The criticism has been made that the energy invested in 
these courses has not gone on to tackle structural changes (Daly, 1989b; Mulvey, 1991, 
1995). Inglis (1994) on the other hand, while acknowledging these criticisms and also having 
a central concern with power, concludes that the groups’ concentration on personal 
development courses is based on felt needs and interests. The next section examines the 
content of such courses, and the following one outlines some of the debates which surround 
personal development education in Ireland.  
 
The content of personal development courses 
There is no set content for personal development courses. However a typical Stage One 
course runs for eight to ten weeks for two to two and a half hours one morning a week, for 
the number of weeks decided on by the facilitator. Topics covered include: reasons for 
coming to the course and hopes and concerns about it; ground rules; life stories, human 
rights; feelings; relationships; guided relaxation and visualisation; managing stress; 
assertiveness; communication skills; setting goals; social analysis; women’s health and 
nutrition; sexuality; education; envisioning ‘my ideal world’; affirmation of self and 
acceptance of praise (Aontas Women’s Education Group, 1991; Clancy, 1995; Clarke and 
Prendiville, 1992; Hayes, 1990).  
There is usually a check-in with each woman at the beginning of a session, to see how she 
has been feeling and what has been going on in her life since the last session. Games, 
icebreakers and energizers are used. ‘Homework’ is usually set, in the form of giving oneself 
a treat during the week between sessions. Self-help is emphasised. The methodology is 
highly participative and women are encouraged to share only as much information about 
themselves as they feel comfortable with. A typical group starts off with twelve to fourteen 
women. Invariably, a few drop out after a week or two. Clancy (1995) also found that some 
groups are run on an ‘open’ basis, with different members attending each week. This was 
found  to be a problem for the development of a sense of collectivity in a group (ibid). When 
I refer to personal development education from here on in this chapter, I assume closed 
groups, running for eight to ten weeks, with the same facilitator or co-facilitators throughout.  
Women come to personal development courses because they feel a need to make some 
changes in their lives, usually starting with family life and with a desire to ‘get out of the 
house more’. This was Clancy’s (ibid) finding and is my experience. Courtney (1992) 
interprets the act of participation in most adult education courses as evidence of a desire for 
change and West’s (1996: 25, 26) findings bear out this interpretation. Fagan (1991: 67) 
describes the community women who attended her social analysis classes as ‘searching for an 
unspecified development’. Personal development courses are part of  the distinct process that 
is adult learning. Adult learning is seen as voluntary, self-directed, practical, participatory, 
with sharing of experiences and resources, related to individual’s self-concept or self-esteem, 
and possibly anxiety-provoking for the learners. It also attempts to take cognisance of 
different learning styles (Cranton, 1992: 5 - 7). Of themselves, these qualities do not 
necessarily make for politicisation of the participants. However, the processes which they 
involve are widely seen as essential for radical pedagogies which are also providing new or 
radical content (McDonald, 1989).  
 
Criticisms of personal development education 
Many of the analyses and commentaries on personal development assert that women need to 
‘move beyond’ it, since social structures are the ‘root causes’ of oppression. This is 
emphasised especially in Mulvey’s (1995) report on women’s power, which arises out of a 
conference of women’s networks in Ireland, entitled Women’s Power for a Change. This 
document provides an overview of current dominant feminist attitudes to women’s power and 
personal development education in Ireland, as the conference was attended by influential 
activists, policy makers, academics and community leaders. The report documents frustration 
at the lack of structural change and lack of participation and representation by women in 
community, regional and state development. It exhibits a belief that a concentration on 
personal development is preventing women from engaging in structural analysis.  
Power is implicitly theorised in this report as being juridical in nature (Foucault, 1979; 
Young, 1998). In this juridical view, it is assumed that power resides in a central authority of 
government and law. This notion of power is grounded in a liberal humanist view of society 
and of the person, which sees the strategy for social change as engagement with the ‘public’ 
domain, from which all other change will flow. Such a view of power ignores other sites of 
oppression and domination, which liberal humanism defines as part of the ‘private’ domain. 
It therefore excludes resistance to oppression which takes place in interpersonal relations, 
and in the discursive domain. A discursive view of power emphasises how different truths 
and knowledges are constructed, and how some come to dominate. Feminist 
poststructuralism has recognised the construction of new discourses about women and men to 
be an important site of activism. Such discursive or cultural activism is regarded as a political 
and ideological phenomenon which is just as important as challenges to juridical forms of 
power (Ryan, 1997b; Young, 1998). 
The report in question (Mulvey, 1995) notes the reluctance of women to accept the label 
feminist. It also points out that the priorities of funders mean that women’s work is 
acceptable only if it is ‘poverty work’ (ibid:17). The role of the Roman Catholic church and 
religious personnel in facilitating personal development courses is also noted and identified 
with the failure to address structural issues in personal development. I now examine why 
current forms of personal development education are failing to challenge the gender status 
quo.  
 
Why current personal development practices are incapable of tackling the discursive 
nature of power 
Clancy (1995) in a large-scale survey, found that the majority of personal development 
courses in Ireland are run either by religious personnel or by people with a primary interest in 
counselling and / or psychology. While several writers and commentators have already 
identified religion with the maintenance of the gender status quo, there is little published 
work on the Irish context which makes links between the maintenance of the gender status 
quo and the predominance of a psychological view of women as essentially different from 
men. Gardiner (1997: 42) points to the existence of a ‘dual culture’ or a ‘female culture’ 
mentality in Irish political life as evidence of the continued existence of patriarchal social 
relations.  
It is my view that most personal development education being carried out in Ireland is 
incapable of challenging the gender status quo, because of its roots in psychologies which 
assume a liberal humanist model of the person. Psychology (including mainstream, human 
relations and feminist ‘difference’ psychologies) and the beliefs which they have constructed 
about a distinct female nature and culture play a strong part in maintaining the gender status 
quo. Psychological approaches to women’s personal development and education are usually 
seen as a secular challenge to religious perspectives on women’s nature. This is particularly 
so in Ireland, where traditional, old-style Roman Catholicism is widely seen as having 
contributed to women’s oppression. Both religion and psychology, however, share a view of 
‘woman’ which does nothing to challenge existing power arrangements. Mednick (1989: 
1122) describes the problem as follows: 
It is my view that the different voice / maximalist view, even though professed by 
feminists who are not in agreement with the rightwing agenda, nevertheless attained its 
popularity because it meshed so easily with the pro-family women’s nature ideology 
that has become the dominant public rhetoric ... arguments for women’s intrinsic 
difference, whether innate or deeply socialised, support conservative policies that, in 
fact, could do little else but maintain the status quo vis a vis gender politics.  
The report (Mulvey, 1995) which forms the basis for this discussion, does, indeed, draw 
attention to the strengths which women can bring from personal development into other areas 
of political activity. But what both the report and the conference fail to do is to distinguish 
different types of personal development. Courses in personal development  in this country are 
facilitated from a perspective outside the dominant liberal humanist one, in only a tiny 
minority of cases. This is borne out by Clancy  (1995: 117) who, in a large scale survey, 
found that counselling is the main training undertaken for facilitators. Clancy argues, 
correctly in my view, that counselling training is capable of treating the symptoms, but not 
the causes of women’s oppression and diverts attention away from inequalities to focus on 
individuals. This is not a fault of personal development per se. It is a result of the dominance 
of mainstream psychology practices. 
Mulvey (1995: 19) reports that the conference on power concluded with a number of 
questions for the participants, one of which was ‘What is needed for women to move beyond 
personal development?’ This question would have addressed the issue much better, if it had 
asked what is needed to politicise personal development education for women and prevent it 
becoming an exercise focused solely on personal symptoms, spirituality and individual 
healing? My immediate answer to this question, shared by Clancy  (1995) in her research 
conclusions, is that we need feminist / politicised facilitators who are able to incorporate 
social analysis, radical politics and feminism into course content which is also capable of 
meeting the felt and expressed needs of many women for a focus on their personal and 
domestic lives.  
Martin and Mohanty (1988) ask, ‘What has home got to do with it?’ The answer must be that 
patriarchy and patriarchal relations are at their most naturalised and normalised in family life 
and in heterosexual relations. In the particular point in history where we live now in Ireland, 
and given the strong climate of anti-feminism which co-exists with religious and liberal 
humanist ideological views of women, home life is very important. The family and 
heterosexual couple relationships are one of the prime sites for the reproduction of gender 
difference (Hollway, 1982; 1984; Ryan, 1997a). Moreover, we live in a formally egalitarian 
liberal democracy, where it is acceptable for women to take on roles outside their homes, in 
paid work, sport, party politics and many other arenas. But through discourses which position 
them as essentially domestic and maternal they are still widely considered to be the only sex 
properly suited to primary childcare.  
Issues of domesticity and maternity surface time and again in the personal development 
courses of my experience (cf Clancy, 1995). Dealing with them is a major challenge to 
contemporary feminism (Coward, 1993; Hochschild, 1990). ‘Moving beyond’ personal 
development is not the solution. Politicising personal development by taking feminist 
poststructuralism into account is one of the necessary responses to this many-faceted 
challenge.  
Personal development courses are answering a felt need for women who are taking first steps 
outside their homes. Feminist personal development courses should not be dismissed. Far 
from being dismissed, they should be encouraged and developed in tandem with juridical 
endeavours. By themselves, structural and collective change and agitation will not take the 
place of necessary personal work on emotional investments (which are held by both women 
and men) in the gender status quo. Structural oppressions are felt at the level of the individual 
and they construct emotional responses (Lewis, 1993). Work needs to be done at this level 
always. The greatest danger is that personal change will not be accompanied by political 
change. But on the other hand, political change in outlook, if not accompanied by emotional 
politicisation, is of limited effect.  
 
Social movements and pedagogy 
While the goal of schooling pedagogy was and is to provide public, unified subjects of a 
particular kind, left pedagogy and feminist pedagogies and other liberatory or emancipatory 
pedagogies also had similar aims, even if these were not always explicit. They wanted to 
produce politicised subjects of various kinds (Lusted, 1986) Thus, the notion of false 
consciousness was used by Marxists and by early radical feminists. The implication was that 
once the veil of ignorance was lifted from the eyes of the working class, or of women, or 
whoever was the subject of the pedagogy, then they would change their behaviour. This kind 
of voluntarism relies on a conception of the human subject as primarily rational and therefore 
capable of making changes through the application of willpower.  
On the other hand, pedagogies underpinned by human relations psychology emphasise the 
need to explore feelings which blocked change, but this approach has been shown to be itself 
dependant on a view of the subject as primarily rational. Feelings, in this approach, need to 
be dealt with, but this is ultimately in order to allow the rational part of the person to operate 
unhindered (cf Hollway, 1989, Ryan, 1997b).  
Liberals tend to see subjects as individuals socialised into their appropriate roles. But 
poststructuralist insights show that people are not passively shaped by active others, 
including ‘social structures’. Rather, they ‘actively take up as their own the discourses 
through which they are shaped’ (Davies and Banks, 1992: 3, cited in Jones, 1993: 159). Thus, 
it is possible to interpret girls and women as actively taking up positions in discourses. 
Patriarchy is not ‘a monolithic force which imposes socialisation on girls ... it produces 
positions for subjects to enter’ (Walkerdine, 1989: 205). And the discourses which provide 
the available positions or ‘ways to be’ (subjectivities) shift in contradictory ways. There is no 
one way in which women or girls, as a group, or as individuals, can be fixed in our 
understanding (Jones, 1993: 159).  
In spite of these insights, which for many feminists produce useful feminist knowledge, a 
major influence in feminism is the idea that women have special ‘female’ ways of knowing 
which coincide with essentially female ways of being. This is also perhaps the most visible 
and influential face of feminism in the mainstream of everyday life and the media. It results 
in the portrayal of the female subject as universal and feeling, and in this way as essentially 
different from men. I agree with Brookes (1992) that it is important to connect being and 
knowing through a model of education which draws on the everyday experiences of women, 
but that it will not challenge the gender status quo if it bases itself on a model of essential, 
pre-social differences.  
The Harvard Project on Women’s Psychology and Girls’ Development, from which a great 
deal of this difference work emanates, is a project which represents one of the most 
influential strands of feminist social psychology today (Wilkinson, 1996: 13). Such 
educational work has been influenced by the work of Chodorow (1978), Gilligan (1982), 
Brown and Gilligan (1992, 1993) and Taylor, Gilligan and Sullivan (1995). Its most popular 
manifestation with reference to education is in Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule’s 
(1986) book, Women’s Ways of Knowing. In the next section, I address some of the 
assumptions of this widely read and quoted book, and the implications of its theorisation of 
the female subject (cf  Brookes, 1992).  
A universal female subject 
Drawing on the work of Perry (1970) and positioning themselves against it, Belenky et al use 
the findings of a study of one hundred and thirty-five women learners to reformulate five 
stages of women’s knowing, from silence, through received knowledge, subjective 
knowledge, procedural knowledge to, finally, constructed knowledge. Perry’s work is a study 
of developmental theory derived from his analysis of male students attending Harvard 
University and the ideas in it are still influential. Perry  assumes that students move in a 
linear way, from a basic dualism where the world is viewed in terms of black / white, right / 
wrong, through to increasingly advanced stages. In the last stage, one is presumed to know 
that all knowledge is relative and socially constructed. He asserts that ‘dualists are rare at 
Harvard’ (1970: 63, cited in Brookes, 1992: 41).  
Belenky et al are critical of Perry’s assumptions that people learn in a linear manner. They 
argue that ‘women’s thinking did not fit so neatly into his categories’ (1986: 14), particularly 
women’s experiences of male authority (ibid: 23, 24). However, they build on Perry’s 
scheme when they argue that women’s learning can be grouped into ‘five major 
epistemological categories’ (ibid: 150). Also problematic is their assumption that women 
learn differently from men and therefore require a woman-centred education (ibid: 214 - 
229).  
Any pedagogy which suggests that women’s learning is based on essential differences from 
men is problematic. Theoretically, it is unacceptable, because it assumes that certain kinds of 
knowledge are indigenous to women and to men. Strategically, it is unacceptable, because it 
would isolate women in an academic context which is already highly stratified. Politically, it 
is unacceptable, because it maintains a sex-differences approach and thus maintains male / 
female dualism (Brookes, 1992: 41). Women can benefit from a safe and supportive learning 
environment, but to suggest that they need special, separate environments to meet their 
essentially different needs does not address the need for safety as a political problem. It 
implies that the problem is located in naturally occurring differences between women and 
men (ibid). As Lewis (1989: 122) puts it: 
The language in which Belenky and her colleagues locate women’s experiences in the 
academy -- ‘newborn’, ‘child’, encouraged to ‘think more’, turning her into a ‘real 
knower’ -- suggests that education for women needs to be focused at some primary 
level in order to bring us up to par with the already ‘grown up’ male thinkers who are 
posed as the norm to which we must aspire. It is easy to see how such an approach 
might enhance the already prevalent ideology that education for women is a 
prescription for lowering standards. The terms of the discourse on standards, which 
the language in Women’s Ways of Knowing implies, only makes sense within the 
frames of a phallocentric system where being a man is not only considered to be 
different from being a woman but also considered to be better.  
This categorisation of levels of knowing amounts to a hierarchy of ways of knowing on 
which the authors ultimately base a model of education that might draw women out of a state 
of silence. This state of silence is described as a state devoid of ‘awareness of mental acts, 
consciousness, or introspection’ (Belenky et al, 1986: 25). The aim is to draw women into a 
state of constructed knowledge, described as a condition of ‘becoming and staying aware of 
the working of their minds’ (ibid: 141). In this state, women can create their ‘own’ 
epistemological understandings.  
On the face of it, these stages represent an exciting model and the idea of constructed 
knowledge appears to address the dynamics of the challenge brought to patriarchy by 
women’s education (Lewis, 1989: 120). However, the authors propose to establish the frames 
of their educational model by connecting teaching with midwifery. They propose, following 
Ruddick (1980, 1984), to name the discourse through which women’s education is to be 
articulated as ‘maternal thinking’ (Belenky et al, 1986: 218, emphasis added). This 
proposed political strategy will draw a woman’s knowledge out into the world.  
As a proposed pedagogical strategy, Ruddick’s concept of maternal thinking maintains the 
idea of immutable and natural sex differences and does not address at all the political climate 
(that is, patriarchal social relations and sexist discourses) in which learners’ subjectivities are 
constructed. This is not to dispute the goodwill of the authors or their genuine concern about 
‘why  so many women students speak so frequently of problems and gaps in their learning 
and so often doubt their intellectual competence’ (ibid: 4). But, because of the lack of a 
clearly articulated political agenda, the authors inadvertently slip into the language of 
women’s deficiency and thereby fail to address the deeply complex ways in which women’s 
constraints and possibilities are constructed (Lewis, 1989: 121).  
Belenky et al do not address women’s knowledge as socially and politically organised (cf 
Grimshaw, 1986), but as something intrinsic to women. What they describe is ideology about 
women, but they take this as evidence of natural differences between women and men. In 
doing this, they promote a discourse of male / female dualism. As Brookes (1992: 58) points 
out, they do not address how an explicit theoretical validation of difference -- an assumption 
implicit in mainstream curriculum and academic programming -- might further disempower 
women in an educational system which already is failing to meet their needs, insofar as it is 
organised to reflect male experience and hence to entrench male power and authority.  
Belenky et al use a language of difference to discuss women’s educational needs and to 
propose educational strategies for women. Theoretically, this is a model based on gender 
difference and which draws in turn on recent directions in the works of Chodorow (1978) and 
Gilligan (1982). Common to these theorists is the idea that women learn and know differently 
from men. And in this assumption, which implies that women are naturally different, not that 
women learn differently because of their experiences of male power and abuse of male 
power, there is an inherent lack of politicisation. It locates women’s problems within the 
individual, without considering the social conditions which gave rise to these ways of 
knowing in the first place. These are precisely the effects that personal development 
education will have also, if it does not move beyond essential-difference models of women 
and men.  
Such  models tend to minimise the facts and nature of women’s oppression itself as a major 
contributory factor to women’s lives and experiences (Grimshaw, 1986; Maher, 1987; Pollitt, 
1995). As Maher (1987: 98) points out, while they can attend to political experience, they 
overlook the importance of politically conscious resistance experiences and, I would add, the 
important ways that gender identities are produced in discourses of resistance.  
Knowledge production is political activity. Although they do not acknowledge this, Belenky 
et al have produced knowledge about women which proposes a universal, unitary female 
subject, existing in a dualistic and therefore hierarchical relation to a unitary male subject. 
They preclude the possibility of moving out of or of deconstructing or subverting dualism, by 
their reliance on maternal practices as the vehicle for their pedagogy and by their use of 
restrictive educational categorical ways of knowing, which implicitly deny the possibility of 
generating new knowledge, given different social circumstances.  
The theoretical divisions set up in the work of Belenky et al support a dualistic approach to 
knowledge and the human subject which, far from challenging the status quo, functions to 
reinforce it. Instead of looking at supposedly naturally occurring differences, pedagogy, if it 
is to rise to the challenges posed by poststructural feminist insights, needs to investigate how 
gender difference is produced, how difference can be celebrated without resorting to 
essentialism and how human subjects are organised to know. There is no knowledge which is 
indigenous to women, or to men. The questions which a feminist poststructuralist pedagogy 
could ask are centered on the key question of what social conditions organise women and 
men  to learn differently. 
 
Links between an essential differences approach and mainstream psychology 
Like Hollway (1991: 31), I am constantly struck by how dominant is the idea among feminist 
educational practitioners and theorists that there exist natural differences between the genders 
and that there are naturally different women’s and men’s ways of knowing. In common with 
both Hollway (ibid) and Segal (1987), I am disturbed at the dominance of these dualistic 
ways of thinking about gender and what I see as the negative effects on feminism which 
follow from them. In published work on pedagogy in Ireland (for example, Byrne, 1995; 
Byrne, Byrne and Lyons, 1996; Byrne and Lyons, this volume), there is no attention to this 
idea, although Gardiner (1997) and Mannix (1996) refer to it in the contexts of politics and 
psychology in Ireland, respectively.  
Hollway’s and Segal’s work gives a convincing account of the extent to which dualistic 
thinking about femininity and masculinity dominates white Western feminism. This kind of 
thought depends to a considerable extent on psychological concepts:  
The most accessible feminist writing today is one in which we are likely to read of the 
separate and special knowledge, emotion, sexuality, thought and morality of women, 
indeed of a type of separate ‘female world’ which exists in fundamental opposition to  
‘male culture’, ‘male authority’, male-stream thought’, in opposition to the world of 
men (Segal, 1987: ix).  
Hollway (1991) asks why white Western feminist thought in the 1980s and 1990s has been so 
psychologised, unlike the socialist feminism of the 1970s. The same questions need to be 
asked about recent trends in school education and particularly about large sectors of critical 
adult education’s approach in Ireland. Adult education in general, including personal 
development education, although it defines itself in opposition to regulatory schooling, is still 
deeply affected by human relations psychology and the dominance of an essentialist model of 
the female subject which posits it as universal and feeling. I believe that what is significant in 
accounting for the psychologisation of adult education is  
the closeness of a psychological vision of the world to the dominant popular 
assumptions of Western culture, since what the two have in common is an outlook 
which understands the world in terms of the individual. (ibid: 30) 
This is especially the case in the way that personal development education approaches gender 
issues. Psychology plays a part in reproducing and legitimating popular assumptions about 
individuals and their femininity or masculinity. It places a particular model of the individual 
at the centre of its explanatory world, and while it does so it cannot reconceptualise gender 
issues in terms of the constraints and forces which shape a person and how these may be 
changed (ibid). While personal development education continues to rely on unitary models of 
the subject, whether these are unitary and male, or unitary and female, it will not escape the 
limitations of popular assumptions, legitimated by psychology.  
Practitioners of personal development education who are feminist will probably seek a 
radical political agenda in all areas, including gender issues. But in gender issues feminism is 
frequently reduced to psychology. If personal development education remains within 
psychology’s terms of reference in the use of the categories ‘femininity’ and masculinity’, it 
cannot avoid reducing them to natural differences or to cultural differences, even while 
applying a social analysis.  Hollway (1989: 98ff) makes the same point about social 
psychology, which many feminists claim has set out to combine a social analysis with 
psychological questions. While some of the evidence in Wilkinson’s (1996) collection on 
feminist social psychology shows that some feminist social psychologists (for example, 
Stephenson, Kippax and Crawford, 1996) are beginning to overcome these difficulties, it also 
clear that this is not a widespread theoretical concern.  
 
The challenges for a feminist poststructuralist emancipatory pedagogy  
The solution for personal development education is not necessarlily to abandon psychology. 
One of the reasons that the socialist feminisms of the 1970s became concerned with 
psychological questions was that feminists operating in consciousness raising groups realised 
that the personal is political and that change is not simply a matter of economic resources, 
equal opportunity, correct political intentions and voluntarism. Adult education has taken 
these lessons on board also. But as long as the reliance on femininity and masculinity 
remains, the personal will be reduced to the psychological and the individual, losing in the 
process a vision of the politicised personal and the personal nature of the political. The only 
difference between such use of femininity and masculinity and the old patriarchal psychology 
of sex differences is the re-evaluation of femininity as superior. This is not enough to make a 
political difference in a world of complex social relations characterised by ‘shades of grey’ 
rather than clear-cut essential differences (cf Cocks, 1989). As Segal (1987: 5) points out, 
‘some renowned misogynists are not averse to claiming that women are superior to men. It 
excuses all sorts of bad behaviour, legitimates double standards and does not disturb the 
expectations that women will take primary responsibility for caring, feeling and nurturing’.  
Personal development education needs a theory of how gender differences are produced, 
reproduced and subverted. The theoretical focus needs to be on new forms of femininity and 
masculinity, on politicised subjectivities formed in the struggle to challenge the gender status 
quo. It is not enough to focus on women and men as they are, because gender is produced 
through difference, in relations. Hollway’s work (1982, 1984a, 1989) has shown how gender 
difference is produced in adult social relations. Her focus on relations makes it possible to 
define the question in terms of the production of differences between genders, rather than in 
terms of a psychology of women or of men. Focusing on sex differences leads to comparison, 
but does not fundamentally  challenge the categories male and female. A production-of-
differences approach is not about comparison. ‘It is explanatory rather than descriptive, 
relational rather than comparative, emancipatory rather than normative and dynamic rather 
than static’ (Hollway, 1991: 32).  
Including a psychology of women in adult education has historically been seen as radical in 
the face of a mainstream psychology which tended to take the male as the norm against 
which women were to be measured and most often seen as deficient. This explains the 
enormous popularity of the work of Gilligan (1982), Brown and Gilligan (1992) and Belenky 
et al (1986). These ideas need to be seen in the historical context in which they first became 
popular. Chodorow, on whom they draw, has developed her tinnking in recent years, (for 
example, Chodorow, 1994), yet the popularity of the earlier explanations remains, because 
their explanations are so close to dominant beliefs about women and men and the differences 
between them.  
The insights produced by feminist poststructuralism mean that these explanations and 
approaches are no longer satisfactory. These insights have shown that people are not 
seamlessly socialised into masculinity or femininity. Femininity and masculinity are social 
constructions to which women and men relate in differing and problematic ways throughout 
life. A feminist psychology of the production of gender difference looks at how women and 
men relate to these categories and can theorise change and resistance to change in terms of 
power and in terms of conscious or unconscious investments or interests in gender 
differentiated positions in discourses (see, for example, Hollway, 1984, 1994; Connell, 1995; 
Ryan, 1997a).  
The challenge for a feminist poststructuralist personal development facilitator is to counter 
the dominance of feminist essential difference psychology in order to create a changed 
conceptual framework for practices concerning gender. Producing knowledge about women’s 
and men’s psychologies is based on many diverse interests. A feminist poststructuralist 
interest militates against the production of dominant, monopolising knowledge such as has 
been characteristic, until recently, of psychological knowledge about women or black people 
or working class children (Mama, 1995; Hollway, 1991; Walkerdine; 1989).  
I quote Hollway on a final point about a feminism which accepts the production of gender 
differences: 
It recognises that there are systematic, though not invariable nor determined, 
differences between women and men at the psychological level which despite access 
to material equality are not going to disappear overnight. Ignoring these differences 
would not be in the interests of feminism any more than it is to reduce them to 
women’s biology. The challenge is to be able to explain them, both in terms of their 
tenacious hold over a person’s psyche and in terms of the undoubted scope which is 
available to everyone to exceed and transgress the limits of their psyche and actions 
imposed by gender difference. (Hollway, 1991: 33)  
Change, in the feminist poststructuralist framework, is not a simple escape from constraint to 
liberation. There is no reaching a final realm of freedom, at the end of some linear 
progression which does not exist (Martin and Mohanty, 1988: 201). There is no final 
analysis, ‘because change has to do with the transgression of boundaries which are carefully 
and tenaciously drawn around identity. Connections have to be made at levels other than the 
abstract political one’ (ibid). Seeing how the personal is political is crucial but it is not 
enough. The highly intimate and particular nature of the political has to be acknowledged and 
explored also. This is where earlier consciousness raising practices often left women without 
support. Having identified the connections between personal and political, women often felt 
guilty if they did not immediately throw off the aspects of their lives which they had 
identified as oppressive. Very often, people’s feelings remained in some way unaddressed by 
becoming critically and politically literate: ‘they are the parts which feminism has failed to 
reach -- yet’ (Gill and Walker, 1993: 69). Coward (1993) gives the title ‘our treacherous 
hearts’ to the result of feminism’s failure to deal with  feelings and personal needs.  
 
Conclusion 
Feminism has provided discourses and language for recognising women’s oppression, and a 
desire to see feminism in action, but it has not displaced other, more dominant, discourses, 
within which desires are also constructed, and which probably go further back in time for 
most people, feminism being largely an adult politicisation process. This has produced many 
areas of contradiction for women, including women who do not label themselves feminist but 
who are all nevertheless affected by feminism’s discourses in recent decades. If liberal 
humanist and religious discourses are not challenged within personal development, these 
contradictions will be interpreted as evidence that essential femininity and maternity exist 
after all and that women should accept them. Personal development courses are places where 
people explore feelings and desires. They need to be actively colonised by feminists acting 
outside of liberal humanist and religious discourses, because otherwise they will have anti-
feminist effects.  
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